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ANGOLA
Mine Ban Policy
Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 but has yet
to ratify. As the country returned to war in 1998, both government
troops and UNITA forces have been using antipersonnel landmines.
The ICBL has condemned both sides for use of AP mines, but is
particularly appalled at the Angolan government’s disregard
for its international commitments. Though the Mine Ban Treaty
has not entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory
can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “a
state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose
of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty.” Clearly, new
use of mines defeats the purpose of the treaty.
The renewed use of mines flies in the face of Angola’s rhetorical
support for an AP mine ban. The government first publicly stated
its support for a total prohibition of antipersonnel mines in
1996 at the end of the CCW review conference when Angolan Ambassador
Parreira announced in the final plenary session that “the
Government of Angola supports a total prohibition of all types
of antipersonnel mines.” Angola was active in the Ottawa
Process. It endorsed the pro-treaty Brussels Declaration and participated
in the Oslo negotiations. It voted for the pro-ban UN General
Assembly resolution in 1996, and the pro-treaty UNGA resolution
in 1998.
In Ottawa during the treaty signing ceremony, Angola's then vice-Foreign
Minister Georges Chikoti said:
Coming from Angola, a victim country of landmines, and being present
at this important day for the signing ceremony, is not only a
logical accomplishment for my government but also an opportunity
to underline the expectations of the thousands of Angolan children,
men and women, victims of this deadly, destructive and coward
weapon.... It is mainly in the name of all these people that my
government has taken a strong commitment to achieve a global ban
on antipersonnel landmines... Before I conclude I wish to reiterate
that the Angolan government is ready to cooperate as it has always
done with the international community and all partners of this
treaty who really want it to be implemented over all the Angolan
territory including those areas under UNITA control, in order
to achieve total peace.[1]
These words ring hollow in light of the government's continued
use of antipersonnel landmines. It is clear the government is
in no hurry to ratify or implement the Mine Ban Treaty. At a Red
Cross meeting, Minister for Social Assistance Albino Malungo was
asked by Landmine Monitor about Angolan plans for ratification.
The Minister warned that article one could not be ratified, even
if the rest of the Treaty might be. Quite obviously, such “ratification”
would not be valid.[2]
While one Angolan minister was admitting his country had no intention
to give up the use of landmines, another had just touted Angola’s
having signed the Mine Ban Treaty in calling for more international
aid for mine clearance. In July of 1998, Angola and Zambia reached
agreement to demine their common border areas. And in announcing
the agreement after five days in Zambia, Foreign Affairs Minister
Keli Walubita told reporters that the landmines continue to be
a “major source of insecurity.” The Minister added
that both countries are signatories to the Treaty and “will
approach donors to help them put their demining program in place.”[3]
Angola is a non-signatory of the Convention on Conventional Weapons
and its Landmine Protocol.
Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Approximately
sixty types of antipersonnel mines from nineteen different countries
have been identified in Angola.[4] Little is known about landmine
stockpiles in Angola.[5]
On 28 November 1996 a group of Angolan NGOs formed the Angolan
Campaign to Ban Landmines (CABM), which is supported by some twenty
NGOs. A petition campaign gathered 60,000 signatures by December
1997, including that of Henrik Vaal Neto, the Minister of Information.
Landmine Use Since the Mine Ban Treaty
Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban Treaty in
December 1997 it has since been responsible for systematically
laying new mines and minefields. A researcher for the Landmine
Monitor has been an eyewitness to this gross disrespect of the
Treaty in 1998 and has received numerous reports in 1999 of renewed
landmine warfare in central and northern Angola.[6] These included:
(1) seeing new minefields being prepared in Luena in August 1998,
and also establishing that the provincial authorities had refused
to allow mine clearance operations in these areas;[7] (2) interviewing
newly-arrived refugees in Zambia who said that the Angolan National
Police had protected their police station in Cazombo by putting
landmines in their roof;[8] and (3) speaking with Angolan soldiers
who admitted to planting landmines under orders in August 1998
during operations in Piri and in Uige.[9]
On 2 December 1998, the Jesuit Refugee Service, Mines Advisory
Group, Medico International and the Vietnam Veterans of America
Foundation published an open letter to the government and UNITA
calling upon both sides to stop using landmines, noting that in
Moxico province landmines had maimed or killed sixty-six persons
since June 1998. The organizations wrote: “Demining is forbidden.
Even to mark minefields is forbidden! This is the primary cause
for many to step on mines in areas formerly safe—civilians
as well as military.” The letter also stated that in this
period, UNITA was laying mines along roads and the government
relaid a defensive mine belt around the town.1[0]
The European Union, in a 28 December 1998 declaration, expressed
its “grave concern” about the impasse in the peace
process which has resulted in “a serious deterioration of
the overall political, military, security, social and economic
situation in Angola?.Against this background, the EU regrets the
increase in mine laying activity in Angola, a country that so
far has been a major focus of the Union’s demining efforts
in Africa. The EU calls on the Government of Angola as a signatory
of the Ottawa Convention and particularly on UNITA to cease mine
laying activity immediately and to ensure that valid records exist
so that these weapons can be removed.1[1] Additionally, South
Africa suspended its assistance to Angolan demining operations
in January 1999 because of the new laying of mines.1[2]
In 1999, each side has blamed the other for laying new mines;
some twenty reports are on file with Landmine Monitor. Following
are three examples: (1) Vice-Governor Simeao Dembo said on 10
December 1998 that UNITA had laid 7,000 news mines in areas of
Uige province;1[3] (2) UNITA reported that ten of its troops had
been killed and twenty-five injured in a government minefield
near Kunge (Bie) on 16 December 1998;1[4] and (3) in January 1999,
a Portuguese journalist was shown evidence by government soldiers
of what they called new mining at Vila Nova (Huambo), which had
just been retaken from UNITA rebels.1[5]
Past Use1
Angola has been almost continuously at war since 1961. Landmines
were first used in mid-1961 with the beginning of the struggle
for independence from Portugal. Landmine warfare became more widespread
among nationalist guerrillas beginning in 1968, reflecting growing
external support for their struggle. The FNLA, UNITA and in particular
the MPLA favored their use.1[7] In 1970-71, the Portuguese laid
some minefields along the Zambian border in an attempt to stop
MPLA infiltration.1[8]
Following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial
government precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola.
In January 1975, the three movements that had fought for independence
signed the Alvor Accord providing for a joint interim government
and an integrated national army. However, as the date for military
integration neared, the agreement broke down, and by mid-1975,
the fronts were at war. The United States, Soviet Union and Cuba,
and regional powers became involved in the conflict.1[9]
Between September 1987 and March 1988, there were major battles
in the Cuito Cuanavale area between some 3-5,000 South African
troops and UNITA auxiliaries attempting to stop a larger joint
Angolan-Cuban force advance on Mavinga and eventually UNITA's
headquarters at Jamba. During these operations the South Africans
laid a number of phony and real minefields along their positions.
South African forces also laid antipersonnel mines behind Angolan
government lines as these forces advanced in May 1987 and laid
antipersonnel mines. Sometimes South African units suffered casualties
from antipersonnel mines laid by the MPLA to ambush their operations.
Cuito Cuanavale marked the beginning of new diplomatic attempts
to end the conflict. The following eighteen months saw simultaneously
the most sustained efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement and
some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war. Between April
1990 and May 1991, six rounds of peace talks took place between
UNITA and the government, resulting in a peace agreement, the
Bicesse Accords, which temporarily ended a conflict that had already
taken between 100,000 and 350,000 lives. Under the accords the
MPLA remained the legitimate government during an interim period
in preparation for elections. Monitoring this interim period was
a small United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II).
This peace was short-lived. UNITA rejected the results of the
September 1992 elections and returned the country to war. Mine
warfare also intensified in this third war, with thousands of
new mines being laid by both government and UNITA forces to obstruct
roads and bridges, to encircle besieged towns with mine belts
up to three kilometers wide, and to despoil agricultural land.
In 1993-94, the government surrounded the cities it held with
large defensive minefields. UNITA then laid additional mines at
the edges of the government minefields in an attempt to deny those
in the besieged towns access to food, water and firewood. In March
1993 the government also used air-scatterable mines in Huambo
to protect its retreating forces from UNITA advances.
Throughout 1993-94, battlefield victories and setbacks determined
the pace of international mediation attempts. A series of government
offensives in September 1994 pushed UNITA back from many of its
territorial gains. On 20 November 1994, the two sides signed the
Lusaka cease-fire protocol although it took until February 1995
for most of the fighting to stop. As late as August 1995, the
FAA chief of staff, questioning whether there was true peace,
stated, “We do not want peace only for Luanda, we want peace
for all Angola. Twenty-five kilometers from the capital there
are peasants who die. The roads are mined. There is no freedom
of circulation. Ask these peasants whether this is peace.”2[0]
The Lusaka Protocol envisaged the deployment of over 7,000 UN
troops (UNAVEM III) for a period of up to fifteen months. In late
1996, it became a UN priority to reduce UNAVEM's 7,000-strong
military component, and the withdrawal, which began in earnest
in February 1997, was scheduled to be complete by July. A successor
UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), consisting of military
observers, police observers, a political component and human rights
monitors was formed in April 1997.
The ongoing, sporadic hostilities were marked by the continued
use of landmines in violation of the Lusaka Protocol. Government
and UNITA forces, Cabindan factions, and criminals were all responsible
for new mine laying. In May 1995, Care International temporally
suspended its humanitarian operations in Bie province because
of newly mined roads.2[1] UN Security Council Resolution 1008
of August 1995 “Urges the two parties to put an immediate
and definitive end to the renewed laying of mines.”2[2]
The UN reported in December 1995, “Recently, there had been
several accidents caused by mine explosions in the provinces of
Benguela, Huambo, Malange and Lunda Norte on roads that had already
been in use for several months. The possibility cannot be ruled
out that fresh mines are being laid in some areas, though the
demining that took place prior to the opening of many access routes
was not systematic.”
The director of the Angolan National Institute for the Removal
of Explosive Ordnance (INAROEE), the official coordinating body
for mine clearance, said in 1997 that “there were problems
in 1996 with mines laid on roads we believed were clear, especially
in government zones. There have been official investigations,
but these have been inconclusive. This tendency is declining in
1997.” However, incidents continued in 1997 and into 1998.
Relaying of landmines was particularly bad in the Lunda provinces
were UNITA forces, government forces and criminal groups are defending
their diamond interests. A number of antitank mines in 1995 and
1996 killed diamond workers. But it was not only on roads that
new mines were used. At Cafunfo in Lunda Norte on 18 September
1996 twelve children between six and thirteen years of age were
killed by a POMZ fragmentation mine when they were going to school
from their homes in Bairro Maqueneno. This incident was not reported
in the Angolan media because government forces routinely mined
the center of town between 6:00 pm and 6:00 am—to provide
an early warning system against UNITA or bandit incursions —and
they sometimes forgot to remove all the mines.2[3] In October
1998, the UN once again reported that humanitarian work was being
hampered by “newly laid landmines.”2[4] In December,
Angola plunged back into a fourth war and the UN’s peacekeeping
mission was not renewed in February 1999. Landmines once more
feature prominently in this renewed Angolan conflict.
Landmine Problem
Long cited as one of the most heavily mined countries in the world,
the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines contaminating
Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive landmine
survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward,
with the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating “The
source of the original baseline data remains unknown and the actual
number of landmines may never be determined, although 6 million
appears to be a more reasonable figure.”2[5] There are six
to eight heavily mined provinces in Angola covering roughly 50
percent of the country. Existing records on the locations of landmines
are extremely scanty. And new mine laying with the renewal of
the war only complicates things further. According to statistics
from the National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles
(INAROEE), mine types most commonly found in Angola are from Italy,
China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Romania.2[6]
As already noted, mines have been used by all parties to the various
conflicts in Angola. They have been used offensively and defensively,
in rural areas and cities. Provincial towns and cities were particularly
affected by mine warfare when the fierce fighting resumed after
the 1992 elections.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had been contracted by the UN to
conduct a nation-wide survey of the landmine problem in the northern
eleven provinces, to map the existence of mines, consequences
for local trade and the extent of damage. After a series of delays,
work began on the survey in June 1995, but progress has been slow.
Both sides have been reluctant to give real information about
landmines and access has been difficult. Nevertheless by the end
of 1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined
or suspected mined areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent
of the population lives. Substantial progress had been achieved
in five other provinces.
While, in October 1998, INAROEE reported that 2.4 square kilometers
of high priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared,
removing 17,000 landmines, and that 6,000 minefields identified
since 1995,2[7] the reports of renewed mine use in the conflict
present a “one step forward, two steps back” situation
for mine survey, marking and clearance efforts. Additionally,
renewed clashes once again force people to flee the fighting and
relocate, resulting in mine accidents and changing priorities
for mine action. Although mine clearance operations have encountered
obstacles over the five years of unsteady peace under the Lusaka
Protocol, recent developments have hindered or in some cases terminated
mine action in various parts of the country. Suspensions of operations
are solely dependent on security and once areas are again deemed
safe for operations, most organizations plan to return to the
work they left unfinished.
Mine Action Funding
As described below, attempts to address the landmine problem through
the UNAVEM operation and the creation of the UN’s Central
Mine Action Office (CMAO) and the separate Angolan national body
to coordinate clearance, INAROEE, did not begin until 1994/1995.
Through its 1994 Consolidated Appeal, issued by the UN Department
of Humanitarian Affairs, $584,000 was raised for mine action by
the beginning of 1995— slightly more than the requested
amount.2[8]
A report for the United Nations notes “Funding for mine
action was cobbled together from assessed budgets through UNAVEM
III, voluntary contributions through the UNDHA-administered trust
fund, the Government of Angola and direct bilateral contributions
to specific projects or NGOs. In the absence of central coordination,
comprehensive figures are not available. The year 1995 is indicative;
the interagency humanitarian appeal included $12.4 for mine action.
UNAVEM III’s budget request for mine action in 1995 included
$8.25 million from the assessed contributions of member states.”
The report also indicated that Angola had pledged $1.5 million
for INAROEE at the end of 1995, but it was unclear if the pledge
was ever made available. In mid-1995, the U.S. pledged $7.5 million
for mine action as in-kind and cash support to NGOs and the UN.2[9]
A compilation of donor support for Angola through the end of 1998
shows the following contributions: Australia, $7,687,506; Belgium,
$1,126,959; Denmark, $3,989,312; the EU, $6,851,162; Finland,
$500,000; Ireland, $252,791; Luxembourg, $143,000; the Netherlands,
$3,883,531; Norway, $1,425,000; Sweden, $3,762,500; and the U.S.,
$23,344,000. These contributions total $50,943,011, and while
helpful as an overview, the compilation does not indicate the
years corresponding to various contributions or other “measurable”
parameters.3[0] Countries which have also contributed to mine
action projects in Angola in 1994-1996, but did not appear in
this compilation include Canada, South Africa, Switzerland and
the UK.
Mine Clearance
During the period of relative peace prior to the elections in
September 1992, there was a remarkable contrast between the recognition
of the serious threat landmines present to Angola, and the actual
response to the challenge of eradicating the mines. A UN report
notes, “While there was a general understanding at the time
of the Bicesse Accords that mines had been used extensively, there
was no specific reference to the way in which they were likely
to impact on the peace process nor how the problem would be addressed.
Bicesse clauses concerned with cease-fire modalities stipulated
that observance of the cease-fire would entail the cessation of
‘the planting of new mines and action aimed at impeding
activities to deactivate mines.’”3[1] Before mid-1994,
there had been no systematic assessment of the extent of the landmine
problem, nor any real attempt to coordinate or plan eradication
in an organized fashion. Since the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol,
there have been efforts to seriously confront the landmine problem.
Several separate initiatives were underway prior to the resumption
of hostilities in 1992. FAPLA/FALA teams consisted of soldiers
from both armies and during the pre-election period, they were
working throughout the country with varying success. The teams
were using manual clearance methods, partly because of the lack
of heavy equipment, and partly because they considered it the
most effective. The priorities were to demine the major roads
and railways, and the interiors of towns and villages.3[2] However,
it was questionable as to how systematically the major roads were
cleared. This demining effort had a limited impact, largely due
to lack of organization, resources, and support. These problems
persisted despite the involvement of British military teams in
assisting FAPLA/FALA efforts and by mid-1992 most mine-clearance
had stopped.
The South African Defense Forces also provided technical assistance
and training to the FAPLA/FALA teams in the south of the country
up to mid-1992. These operations cleared some 300,000 mines. In
mid-1992, most sources agreed that the South African contribution
was a well-motivated project based on a good knowledge of the
general problems and the specific devices, many of which had been
laid by the SADF itself.3[3] All the Angolan parties responded
positively to the South African initiative. South Africa has since
provided training for Angolans in mine clearance in South Africa
and two courses took place in 1998. However, in January 1999,
this assistance was suspended because of the new laying of mines.3[4]
UN and Angolan Mine Action Offices
In March of 1994, the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
Unit (UCAH) began plans to set up a Central Mine Action Office
(CMAO. Its mine action plan called for an integrated, prioritized
approach, with UCAH/CMAO as the focal point. There were problems
in 1995 in obtaining funding for this project because of overall
UNAVEM control and CMAO found itself in a lengthy battles for
the release of funds. Although CMAO submitted its first procurement
package to UNAVEM in May 1995, it was not until November that
equipment was made available.
UNAVEM III itself was also engaged in mine-clearance. In May 1995,
an engineering company of 206 Indian troops arrived in Angola
as part of 1,200 men joining UNAVEM III. The Indian engineers
engaged in mine clearing and the repair of bridges and roads,
among other tasks. An advance party of British engineers which
arrived in April also cleared priority roads and cantonment areas
for demobilizing troops. Namibia and Brazil also provided 200
troops with mine clearing experience.
Because of the infighting, in November 1995 a senior Department
of Humanitarian Affairs New York staff member visited Angola in
an effort to resolve the delays. The visit produced a new document
which redefined the roles and responsibilities of the key players.3[5]
The entire senior staff left CMAO and a new team took over in
early 1996 but there remained a lack of continuity and a paucity
of Lusophone speakers in the CMAO. By March 1997, the top six
posts were all empty.3[6] After the termination of UNAVEM III
in 1997, responsibility for UN demining activities was transferred
to the UNDP and CMAO became the UN Demining Program-Angola (UNDPA).3[7]
In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action
office, INAROEE, and by the end of the year the government pledged
to fund the office with US$1.5 million. Essentially CMAO and Angola’s
INAROEE were to work side-by-side in a joint operations center
in Luanda. There was little initial co-ordination with the UN
although INAROEE was to be the national body to take over CMAO
mine action work once the UN mandate expired.3[8] INAROEE was
made up of an integrated UNITA and FAA team with forty staff members
provided by CMAO, and in its original plan, was to be headquartered
in Luanda and have one brigade in each of the eighteen provinces.
In 1998, INAROEE was operating with seven demining brigades; the
remainder had not been formed due to a lack of funds.
Also, in late 1995, there were plans to establish a joint government-UN
funded institute, CMATS, to train and equip Angolan demining teams.3[9]
Its plan to train 500 Angolan deminers by the end of 1996 failed
because of “internecine control disputes among UN entities,
lost time and resources and the exclusion of certain prospective
students because of factional differences between UNITA and FAA.”4[0]
By December 1996, 350 Angolan nationals had been trained and six
brigades had been deployed to four of the country’s eighteen
provinces; only three of the brigades are fully operational in
Cuando Cubango, Uige, and Moxico provinces. CMATS was handed over
to INAROEE in February 1997, but it continues to receive support
from UNDP, notably technical advisors.
There is no shortage of criticism about INAROEE’s work regarding
poor safety standards, and that its brigades are not working,
and there has been a strike of deminers over lack of pay.4[1]
Co-ordination with INAROEE has not always been good, and remains
a problem among various mine clearance programs in the country.
Some NGO programs had been operational prior to INAROEE, and are
not willing to change their priorities. Some problems have resulted
from the multiplicity of actors, others were because of priorities.
One provincial governor wanted a motor-cross track demined as
a high priority—before the scheduled clearance of a water
point in a city which had no other access to water.4[2]
But criticism is not restricted to the Angolan government and
INAROEE. A multi-country study for the UN noted that the UN and
Angolan government initiatives were “doomed” from
the beginning. The report cites complete lack of communication
and cooperation, byzantine bureaucratic procedures slowing down
or blocking almost completely mine action, a lack of professionalism
within the UN itself and infighting over control over the program
in Angola among the many problems. Its assessment states that
the “utter failure of the UN and Government to cooperate
effectively through their respectively chosen instruments, CMAO
and INAROEE, discouraged donors in general.” The study concluded
that since it is a relatively “young” mine action
program,
In theory, it was in a strong position to benefit from the experiences
of other programs. In reality, the Angolan program has proved
the most problematical of the four [countries in the study]. Some
of the difficulties can be attributed to the political environment
and the many obstacles which have slowed the peace process. Also,
since Angola is a country rich with diamonds and oil which produce
a high annual revenue, donors and others wanted to see the government
make a strong commitment to tackle the problem of mines before
soliciting support from the international community?.Angola is
a text-book case of how not to initiate a mine action program.4[3]
Commercial Demining
Because of the lack of capacity to clear mines quickly in this
period, the UN contracted out for demining operations, awarding
the South African firm, Mechem, $6.5 million in June 1995 to clear
mines along more than 7,000 kilometers of priority roads and to
offer quality assessment of other road clearance operations. Thirteen
priority roads in the north, center and south of country had been
drawn up for clearance. Although scheduled to start in September
1995, a mixture of bureaucratic delays, Mechem’s refusal
to pay bribes and suspicion of Mechem by military officials resulted
in a delay in off-loading its equipment in Luanda harbor.4[4]
(In June 1994 the director of Mechem had boasted that, “There
are some mines in Angola which no one will be able to find without
our help.”4[5]) Although the government gave Mechem permission
in early December to become operational, the project only got
underway on 11 January 1996. The German government has also provided
a couple of quality assessment officials for this project.
Mechem’s operations were based upon twenty-five air-sensing,
armor-plated Caspir vehicles working in tandem with dog demining
teams and other manual methods. Mechem deployed two teams, one
in the north and the other in the south of Angola. The teams of
seventy-five deminers included sub-contracted personnel of other
demining companies, such as Ronco, Gurkha Security Guards and
Mine-Tech. Eleven Angolan deminers also worked with the Ronco
team. Mechem completed its clearance contract in the southern
sector in August, and by December 1996 had cleared over 4,000
kilometers of roads. UNITA never allowed it to clear the Malange-Andulo-Kuito
route.
Other commercial firms are clearing mines around the Soyo oil
installations, employed by FINA and SONANGOL. The Executive Outcomes-linked
firm Saracen worked in Soyo, replacing the French firm Cofras,
and its successor CIDEV. The South African firm Shibata Security
and the British firm, Defence Systems Limited, have also engaged
in small-scale demining exercises in the Soyo area. CIDEV has
distributed a proposal for a mechanized demining operation of
Huila province but has failed to attract funding to date.4[6]
The Italian firm Apalte Bonificação e Construção
(ABC) employed four brigades of twenty deminers on a demining
exercise along the Benguela railway from early 1998.4[7] With
renewed conflict it is unclear what happened to this project.
NGO Mine Action Initiatives
Kap Anamur: The Kap Anamur Committee is a German humanitarian
NGO founded in 1979. Kap Anamur set up a mine clearance project
in Angola in May 1992 and clearance began in August. Through agreement
with the Angolan government the town of Xangongo (Cunene province)
was chosen as a starting point for the operation. The German government
loaned gratis former East German military equipment, including
a number of T-55 tanks with KMT-5 rollers and off-road trucks.4[8]
FAPLA and FALA sent a group of well trained sappers to work jointly
on the project, but the FALA members left after the 1992 elections.
In 1993 the operation had five Germans, twenty-five local sappers
from FAA and twenty mechanics attached to the project at a running
cost of $20,000 a month. Between mid 1992 and 1994 Kap Anamur
cleared minefields and mine clusters in Cunene province and claims
to have removed 50,626 AT mines and 25,338 AP mines.
In early 1995, Kap Anamur attempted to move its operations from
Cunene to Benguela province with fatal consequences. On 1 March
1995, five people, including one German attached to the project
were killed by unidentified gunmen at Solo, 100km from Benguela.
The attack appears to have been aimed at keeping the road closed
because the clearance team had received several indirect warnings
about work in the area prior to the incident. Cap Anamur was also
involved in controversy because one of its expatriate staff was
arrested in 1995 for his involvement in the illegal export of
munitions to Namibia. Kap Anamur ceased operating in Angola in
1996.4[9]
Mines Advisory Group: MAG's presence in Angola dates back to mid-1992
with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign in cooperation
with UNHCR. Following a specialist mission by MAG to Angola in
November 1993, MAG began operations in April 1994 setting up a
base in Luena, Moxico Province. Luena was chosen because of its
critical location for returning refugees following a cease-fire.
Additionally there is a shortage of land both for the communities
and for agricultural projects of relief agencies because of mines.5[0]
By October 1994 the construction of its demining school was finished
and within two years, 134 deminers were operational and thirty
more had just been trained. Nine minefields had been prioritized
for initial clearance operations. Several UN officials criticized
MAG's focus of resources on this one area as being extravagant
and that MAG should be working on clearing priority routes in
the short term. Mine-clearance operations in Moxico province were
suspended in mid-January 1995 until late March because of a dispute
with the Governor although none of the minefields prioritized
for clearance served a military role. This problem was eventually
resolved with the intervention of the Minister of Social Assistance,
Albino Malungo. In October 1996, MAG also expanded its clearance
operations to Lumeje, UNITA’s “capital” in Moxico
province.
By 1998, MAG had expanded operations beyond Lumege to Luau, which
has a severe mine problem and will be a focal point for repatriation
from Zaire.5[1] MAG employs over 200 deminers and seven MATs,
which are mine awareness staff and minefield survey personnel
who work together in gathering information and marking mined sites
in order to assess what are the local priorities for clearance.5[2]
However, MAG has been the most affected by the deteriorating situation
in Angola, closing operations there in mid-1998 due to the worsening
tension in the area. MAG operations in Luau were hit by mortar
fire during a clash between government and UNITA troops.5[3] The
staff had to evacuate and the project's equipment in Luau was
lost. Other areas in MAG's area of operation were subsequently
the scene of battles and new mine laying, which led to its decision
to leave Moxico.5[4]
MAG maintained an administrative presence in Luanda while it assessed
the situation in Angola. It decided not to return to Moxico province,
but did recommenced activities in Angola at the end of 1998 in
Cunene province in the south of the country.5[5] MAG is working
south and west of Ondjiva and continues exclusively with its MAT
format from Luena, which consists of small mixed teams of survey,
clearance, mine awareness and community liaison personnel.5[6]
Two MATs are being formed, with two more to be trained by the
end of the year. In Luena, Medico International restarted the
mine awareness component of MAG's Luena program with some assistance
from other mine action NGOs in November 1998, and its work is
directed at the some 36,000 internally displaced people who have
settled in Luena due to the increased clashes in surrounding areas.5[7]
Since March 1999, the mine awareness program has been run exclusively
by Medico.
Halo Trust: The British NGO Halo Trust began operating in Kuito
in late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry
of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to
the Halo Trust for demining operations in Kuito, Benguela and
Huambo provinces. Britain's ODA has provided funds for mine clearance
in Benguela. Halo Trust's initial work was in the city of Kuito
itself with a team of twenty-six Angolans and twelve expatriates.
Between November 1994 and February 1995, Halo destroyed 1,200
mines in central Kuito, but in May 1995 Halo Trust faced a crisis
over its operations, following a dispute with the Governor of
Kuito, who indicated that he wanted the team removed from Bie
province. The Halo Trust Manager in Luanda said that the government's
confidence in them has improved, but that UNITA is still distrustful,
and refuses to share information about where UNITA mines are located.
Halo claimed to have cleared 3,000 mines in 1995.5[8] Operating
from a base in Huambo, with another field office in Kuito, Halo
has also conducted limited local surveys in Benguela and Huambo
and began clearing mines in Huambo in January 1996. In early 1998,
Halo received its first mechanical equipment, an armored front
loader.
Although Halo operated a team of de-miners who were former UNITA
combatants, the organization had been plagued with access problems.
While they were able to demine certain UNITA areas easily, they
have been stopped from clearing other areas and have had cleared
areas re-mined repeatedly.5[9] Despite the changing security situation,
Halo continues to maintain its bases in Kuito and Huambo.6[0]
Halo considers the security situation in the area to be not much
different from when it originally began its program there in 1994
and 1995 shortly after the Lusaka peace agreement. The increased
security threat from military activities in the two provinces
has turned Halo's focus to clearance of areas closer to the two
centers where there is still considerable debris to be cleared.6[1]
The concentration on areas close to the two towns also coincides
with priorities to assist internally displaced people who have
relocated nearer to both Kuito and Huambo. In addition to mine
clearance, Halo continues to perform survey and UXO clearance
tasks and monitors the location of antitank mines on routes around
its areas of operation to inform aid agencies to avoid accidents
when delivery of humanitarian aid is again a priority.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): The demining operation of NPA is
the largest in Angola. Like Halo Trust, NPA in January 1995 obtained
a government permit to clear mines in Malanje province. In early
1995, NPA found starting up difficult, indeed witnessing in some
instances government forces continuing to plant mines and blocking
NPA's attempt to become fully operational. In February 1995, NPA
began to deploy its first team of deminer graduates in platoons
in two locations along the Malanje-Luanda corridor as part of
an agreement with the World Food Program and SwedRelief. In 1996,
NPA gradually starting clearing land around Malanje.6[2] And,
on 3 October 1996, NPA announced the start of its clearance operations
in Cuanza Norte province.6[3]
In 1997, NPA received its first two mechanical de-mining machines,
Scottish Aradvarks. In 1998, NPA acquired two Danish Hydrema flails.
It also introduced dogs in 1996, although initially these suffered
from sickness. According to NPA figures in 1998 it employed 650
people in Angola, including 350 manual de-miners and over thirty
dogs and handlers. NPA had operations in Luanda, Lobito, Malanje
and Ndalatando.6[4] The organization continues to conduct survey,
marking and clearance using dogs, machines and manual methods
in Angola as well as providing technical assistance to the national
demining organ INAROEE. On 24 February 1998, NPA announced that
1,800 areas had been identified as suspected of being mined in
Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Malanje, Namibe and Cunene provinces.6[5]
NPA has called for mine action to continue now in the face of
deteriorating security in certain areas of the country when it
is most needed to assist dislocated civilians.6[6] However, its
operations in Malange province were stopped in January after military
clashes escalated. Mine verification and road clearance in Cuando
Cubango province were also curtailed in December when military
actions increased in the province. Operations in other areas were
also affected to some extent, but NPA was able to re-deploy teams
to areas where security was not a problem and priorities for operations
identified. Another factor that hampered operations was the limitations
on air transport and cargo, since almost all NGOs working in the
interior of Angola depend on air transport and after the shooting
down of two UN airplanes the frequency of flights has declined.6[7]
Save the Children Fund (USA): Save the Children Fund (USA) won
a mine clearance contract from USAID in 1995. SCF initially funded
expanded NPA teams to clear mines in Cuanza Sul and Bengo and
Moxico provinces to make agricultural land accessible to the internally
displaced, refugees, demobilized soldiers and residents. SCF-USA
has established a demining school near Sumbe and commenced in
January 1996 to train 170 deminers through NPA. A total of 250
deminers were trained and SCF took over management of the operations
from NPA. However, in late 1996, SCF’s clearance operation
ran into problems following a serious accident and its mine clearance
operations were suspended pending a review. When one of its teams
was clearing a pylon in Cunene province, a group of deminers was
at the site of a recently uncovered mine, when it exploded injuring
several of them. The medical evacuation was described by UN official
as a “comedy of errors” with the vehicle carrying
the injured crashing and no senior supervisory staff on location
at the time of accident.6[8]
Care International (USA): Care International (USA) is funding
Greenfield Consultants, a new commercial firm based in the UK
and run by the former Halo Trust manager in Mozambique. Greenfield
signed a twelve month contract with Care which calls for two clearance
teams operating in Cuando Cubango province, plus mine awareness
programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces. The
clearance teams were deployed in December 1995,6[9] and cleared
mines in Huambo in late 1996. CARE/Greenfields Inc. was also working
in Bie province but terminated mine-related work and evacuated
its staff from the province in mid-March due to the increased
conflict between the government and UNITA.7[0] Up until its departure,
the CARE program was performing demining and UXO clearance.7[1]
The staff is in Luanda and hopes to return to work in Kuito as
early as May 1999 depending on improvements in the security situation.7[2]
Menschen gegen Minen (MgM): MGM is a German based NGO which is
run by former members of Kap Anamur who left that organization
because of increasing controversy over its safety and ethical
record. MgM, funded mainly by the German government, was awarded
a contract from the World Food Program in August 1996 to clear
roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province.
The first clearance operations commenced in November around Dange
bridge and quickly progressed.7[3] MgM, continued to clear mines
on roads and bridges in Bengo province in December and January
1999.7[4] The clearance facilitated the resettlement of 7,000
internally displaced people from the “Boa Esperança”
camp near Caxito, and the camp has now been officially closed.
Currently MgM is training mechanics, operators and dog handlers
for its integrated clearance method at the INAROEE training center
in Viana outside Luanda. In May, MgM plans to begin demining in
Caxito in an area where Save the Children formerly had attempted
mine clearance.
Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German based mine clearance
organization, run by Gerhart Bornman. Like MGM, Santa Barbara
became operational in Angola in late 1996, is funded by the German
government, and has been awarded a contract by the WFP to clear
routes that will be used by internally displaced persons resettling
in Benguela province. It reports that the increased tension has
not affected its mine clearance operations to date.7[5]
HMD: HMD, a British organization, was to begin operations in Saurimo
in Lunda Sul Province in 1998, but to date, they are not known
to have begun operations.
Mine Awareness
Coordinated by the CMAO, a national mine awareness program was
started in 1994 by UNICEF and Angolan NGOs, using media and messages
printed on bags and clothing. At the same time, UNHCR began plans
with other humanitarian organizations to start a repatriation
program. The campaign was led by NPA in co-ordination with Catholic
Relief Services, UNICEF, International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies and the Norwegian Refugee Council.7[6]
It was originally planned to train 390 local mine awareness instructors
in eleven cities in nine provinces between 1 May 1995 and 1 May
1996, but this was extended to September 1996 and a further 240
local mine awareness instructors were trained. According to the
CMAO by September 1996 an estimated 920,000 people have received
mine awareness training and eighty-two supervisors and more than
620 instructors had been trained in thirteen provinces. MAG discontinued
mine awareness programs in refugee camps in Zambia and in the
Congo as their was no repatriation, due to increased hostilities.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Angolan Red
Cross also supported mine awareness training for their national
staff and districts in 1997 and 1998.. UNHCR and UNICEF supported
mine awareness campaigns by MAG, Handicap International and NPA.
The Catholic Relief Services and World Vision International also
engaged in mine awareness work.7[7]
Like with the mine clearance itself, there have been problems
of co-ordination in mine awareness operations. MAG criticized
NPA efforts in Luena and NPA has complained about CARE International
efforts in Menongue which they allege duplicate existing services;
they also say that CARE pays three times NPA wages, destroying
local salary structures and undermining confidence and momentum
in the NPA program.7[8]
Landmine Casualties
Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita
in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has
many thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured
by landmines. The government claims that there are 100,000 amputees
in the country although the more widely used figure is 70,000.
However in general an estimated one in every 415 Angolans has
a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child casualties
ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces
of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.
The government has produced figures only for mine fatalities among
FAPLA soldiers in the “Second War:” between 1975 and
1991, 6,728 were killed by mine explosions.7[9] In reality, however,
there are no reliable estimates for the total number of people
killed by landmines. Because of the scarcity of medical care for
the civilian population, the true figure probably is very high.
Lack of a national-level victim database hampers casualty estimation,
but the ICRC and UNICEF believe that there are at least 120 new
landmine victims per month in Angola.8[0]
It appears that the provinces of Bie and Huambo have suffered
a disproportionate share of landmine injuries. However, the landmine
problem is also very severe in the south and east, particularly
in Moxico Province. The great majority of victims are young men,
a fact which has contributed to the militancy of many amputees
in demanding their rights.
Among the civilians, men and women of all ages are affected. Children
are an important minority of those affected by landmines. A needs
assessment by UNICEF in December 1997 concluded that over a two
year period in Bie there was a 70 percent decline of mine-related
accidents and a 82 percent decrease in Huambo. This was due to
mine awareness campaigns, on-going demining operations and knowledge
acquired by IDPs.8[1]
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Care and rehabilitation for FAPLA, and later FAA, soldiers is
the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar
(SAMM) of FAA. It functions well, in part because the government
and military attract good people by offering benefits and access
to goods. In its Jamba headquarters, UNITA's Special Department
for War Wounded was set up in 1989. Up to 1992 it had at least
three units caring for was amputees. One of these produced twenty
artificial legs per month. The center collapsed in late 1994 due
to a lack of resources.8[2] For soldiers, assistance was usually
more rapid, with immediate evacuation often by helicopter or vehicle.
The first-aid provided was usually extremely rudimentary, consisting
of no more than bandaging the wound and providing comfort and
perhaps some painkilling drugs.
For most civilians injured by landmines, transport to the nearest
first-aid post usually involved being carried manually or by cart;
onward transport to a hospital was usually by car or sometimes
by airplane. Civilians had to wait on average for about thirty-six
hours before arriving at a hospital. One man interviewed for this
report believed that it had been six days before he received hospital
treatment. Adequate treatment is scarce. Drugs are often in short
supply, and the staff are less qualified and motivated than in
government- run hospitals. The variable quality of medical care
means that hospitals can be dangerous for amputees. Wounds may
become affected and secondary or even tertiary amputations often
are needed. There has also been a high incidence of osteomyelitides,
a bone-wasting disease, which may set in after a poorly-done amputation.
Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical
rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the
provision of rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been
significantly affected by the recent increase in conflict in Angola.
The existing facilities for landmine victims are grossly inadequate.
A prosthesis can only be expected to last two to three years,
and children require new ones at least every year, as they outgrow
the one they have. This means that a total of over 5,000 new prostheses
is required every year, merely to cope with the existing number
of amputees. This is more than twice the number currently being
manufactured.
The ICRC ran a center at Bombo Alto, near Huambofrom 1980 to 1992.
It included eleven technicians working solely on the manufacture
of artificial limbs and seventy-eight workers in all. In 1996,
with a fragile peace restored, the ICRC reopened a renovated Bombo
Alto orthopedic center in Huambo and also opened a new center
in Kuito. An agreement was also signed with the Ministry of Health
regarding the provision of orthopedic services. The center in
Kuito was closed for two weeks in December due to clashes between
the government and UNITA, and Huambo was also closed for a lesser
period of time in December around Christmas. Patients who would
usually come from some distance and stay in the centers' dormitories
were reluctant to leave their homes and ICRC was likewise reluctant
to have patients from outside the urban centers housed in its
dormitories during periods of shelling. Since the re-opening of
the centers, ICRC reports that operations and patient numbers
have almost completely returned to levels prior to the latest
round of fighting. ICRC has recently expanded operations in Luanda
to take full responsibility of the prosthetics workshop and components
production at the Neves Bendinha.8[3]
The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha.
The orthopedic components unit was completely refurbished in 1995.
The ICRC and the Swedish Red Cross had also signed a cooperation
agreement for the center. The Dutch Red Cross also has a center
at Viana, Luanda Province.
Handicap International (HI) visited Angola in February 1995 to
assess possible participation in mine action programs. HI already
has a rehabilitation program for disabled persons in Benguela
including an orthopaedic workshop, physical rehabilitation and
an information campaign on the prevention of disabilities. By
late 1998, it was operating four clinics outside Luanda in Benguela,
Lobito, Negage and Bailundo, but closed the center in Bailundo,
the headquarters of UNITA, in September 1998, due to increased
military clashes in the area. The center in Negage in Uige province
was scheduled to be turned over to the Ministry of Health later
this year, but the increased breakdown in security, hastened the
turn over and HI left Negage in November 1998. The center continues
to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and Lobito
have not directly been affected, but have experienced a deficit
in patients of some ten to twenty a month due to the inability
of patients to safely reach the workshops.8[4] HI plans to start
general social reintegration projects related to both workshops,
but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security
situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work
at the Viana Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the
physical rehabilitation programs in Angola.
Medico International and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation,
under the name Veterans International, continue to provide physical
and social rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico Province.
Tensions in the region coincided with the end of year holidays
and leave time for expatriate staff, which caused the center and
social programs to stop from the second week in December until
the beginning of February. Since restarting, the program has been
limited to working with mine victims within a five to eight kilometer
radius of the city of Luena. All registered below the knee amputees
have been fitted in Luena and the workshop is now concentrating
on above the knee amputees and any recent mine victims. The social
teams that had been working with a variety of groups in surrounding
areas are now concentrating on specific areas of the city and
the recent displaced population that has settled in Luena. 8[5]
Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities
are available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant
to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their
future will consist of being cared for by their families, or attempting
to earn a living in one of the few occupations open to them, such
as the street trading or—for those with education—secretarial
work. The majority who come from farming backgrounds are likely
to remain a burden on their families
for the foreseeable future. Many have been reduced to begging;
amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan towns. Angola
will have to live with the human cost of the landmine wars for
many years to come.
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